In the late 50's (the time of active struggle against racial segregation in The United States) French philosopher, Gilbert Simondon writes his paper "On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects" where he argues that culture must come to terms with technical entities as part of its body of knowledge and values. He proposes the recognition of the modes of existence of technical objects to be the
result of philosophic consideration and compares this process with analogous to what the abolition of slavery achieved in affirming the worth of the individual human being ( Simondon 1958).
In the process of overcoming phenomenological subjectivity, most scholars were focusing on a revising of an animal's position as a speechless and subaltern entity, which even doesn't experience pain (according to Descartes). Inevitably to reinvent the understanding of a human, the main human features started to be rifled through. Thereby Georgio Agamben named language as such distinguisher, the phenomenon, not given naturally or inherent in the psychophysical structure of man, but produced historically with not proper assignment neither to man nor to an animal. "If this element is taken away, the difference between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a nonspeaking man - Homo alalus, precisely— who would function as a bridge that passes from the animal to the human" ( Agamben 2002). This Homo alalus - the figure of exclusion - means a perfect example of bare life: deprived state of non-achievement of human's (according to Heidegger) Dasein stage. Derrida, distinguishing the absolute other under the gaze of his cat, pondering about its ability to respond: "When it responds in its name (whatever respond means and that will be our question), it doesn't do so as the exemplar of a species called cat, even less so of an animal genus or realm" ( Derrida, Wills 2002). He's focusing on the name, given to a cat, but before the name, he recognizes an animal itself, whom Derrida is following after with the notion of his nakedness. Anyway, the question of speech remained to be open, but the vague hints of overcoming subjectivity are fumbled: to be is to be with, after, alongside, before: in different modes of being but with an animal. Uexküll, much focusing on a temporal neither morphological understanding of animals was not keen to compare them to machines: an animal was at best an imperfect machine (Parikka 2009). Nevertheless, his proposed distinction of "the Umgebung, the objective space in which we see a living being moving, from the Umwelt, the environment-world that is constituted by a more or less broad series of elements that he calls "carriers of significance" (Bedeutungsträger) or of "marks" (Merkmalträger), which are the only things that interest the animal" (Agamben 2004) is desirable to imply on machines, since they achieved proper complexity, so the discussion about Artificial Intelligence became possible. The uniqueness of a relation man-machine is accumulated in the fact that, following Simondon, "the machine with a superior technicality is an open machine and the ensemble of open machines assumes a man as a permanent organizer and as a living interpreter of the interrelationships of machines." He comes up with a beautiful comparison of a man with a conductor: "far from being the supervisor of a squad of slaves, man is the permanent organizer of a society of technical objects which need him as much as musicians in an orchestra need a conductor. The conductor can direct his musicians only because, like them, and with a similar intensity, he can interpret the piece of music performed; he determines the tempo of their performance, but as he does so his interpretative decisions are affected by the actual performance of the musicians; in fact, it is through him that the members of the orchestra affect each other's interpretation; for each of them he is the real, inspiring form of the group's existence as a group; he is the central focus of interpretation of all of them in relation to each other. This is how a man functions as a permanent inventor and coordinator of the machines around him. He is among the machines that work with him". This openness being noticed by Uexküll in animals became a key factor of Deleuze and Guattari texts, where they speak of positing a plane of immanence on which the issue of categorical differences between animals and humans, nature and technology is bracketed and the view of affects, movements, and relations among parts is posited as primary (Parikka 2010). Furthermore, Deleuze extends this plane of immanence to a technics of nature,
in which "artifice is fully a part of Nature, since each thing, on the immanent plane of nature, is defined by the arrangements of motions and affects into which it enters, whether these arrangements are artificial or natural" (Deleuze, Guattari 2015). This statement justifies the supposed chance to enter the plane of immanence through an interaction with a machine that has to stop, recalling Simondone, being unrecognized, materialized, and enslaved stranger. Since personalities and entities are studied in the motion, in the transition, a machine is something that slows down entropy and stabilizes the world.